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RIGHTS OF A CO-PATENTEE TO ASSIGN OR LICENCE-
SECTIONS 33(5) AND 53(1) OF THE PATENT ACT. The Patent
Act provides that where a patent application is made jointly by two
or more inventors, "the patent shall be granted in the names of all
the applicants".' It provides further that:
"Every patent issued for an invention is assignable at law, either as to
the whole interest, or. as to any part thereof, by an instrument In
writing."2
What is the implication of these sections? First, there can be
co-ownership of the patent; that is, two or more persons hold the
patent rights as tenants in common. Secondly, a patentee may assign
all of his interest or any part of it. Thus, it appears, on the basis of
these provisions, where two or more persons hold a patent as co-
owners, either co-owner may assign, without any restrictions, the
whole or any part thereof, of his interest in the patent.
In fact, nowhere in the Act is it stipulated that the rights of
co-owners are restricted inter se, either as to the assignment or the
licencing of their respective interests. However, although the Patent
Act leaves the way open for a co-patentee to deal with his rights as
granted by the patent in his own discretion, this note will demonstrate
that there are in fact restrictions on his ability to assign or license
his interest. The nature of the restriction is that he may not partially
assign his interest, or assign the whole of it to two or more persons,
or license at his pleasure.
It should be pointed out that these restrictions apply only when
a patent is granted originally to two or more persons. If the patent
is granted originally to a sole individual, he has complete liberty to
dispose of his interest in a number of ways. For example, a patentee
may assign a partial share of all the subject matter. In Dunnicliffc
Bagley v. Mallet,3 Byles J. said:
"There can be no doubt that an assignment of a patent to several persons
in individual shares is good. My Brother Hayes says the assignees
would in that case take as tenants n common. If so, there can be no
reason why they should not take different portions, one, one tenth;
another, nine-tenths."4
1The Patents Act, R.S.C. 1952, c. 203, s. 33(5).
2Ibid., s. 53(1).
3 (1859), 7 C.B.N.S. 207, at p. 228.
4 The effect is 'that a patentee may assign one tenth of his Interest to one
person and nine-tenths to another, but a patent does not give a right to the
patentee to use his invention or manufacture according to his Invention. He
would have that right apart from the patent. What the patent confers is a
right to exclude others from manufacturing in a particular way and using a
particular invention. Thus it follows that a patentee who holds as a co-owner
could not be held accountable to the other co-owner for any profits derived
from his utilization of the patent because the right conferred Is a right to
prevent the rest of the world from using the invention (per Romer J. in Steers
v. Rogers, [1892J 2 Ch. 13 despite a dicta to the contrary in Hancock v. Bewley
(1859), 1 Johns 601; 70 E.R. 559), but as between the co-patentees or co-
assignees this right does not arise.
Thus a person who holds one-tenth of the whole subject matter would
have equal rights to the use of the subject matter as would a person who
holds nine-tenths of all the subject matter.
It is submitted that no greater rights would be obtained by receiving a
greater portion of the whole subject matter and thus the statement of the
learned judge, it is submitted, is irrelevant.
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Sometimes a patent may include several things which are in
their nature perfectly distinct and severable. For instance, in a
particular patent, the process claims would be severable from the
apparatus claims. In such case, the patentee might assign the process
claims to one person and the apparatus claims to another. Or, again,
although it is provided by section 38(1) of the Patent Act that, "a
patent shall be granted for one invention only",5 if a patent con-
taining more than one invention is allowed to proceed to issue, the
section expressly says that it is not invalid for that reason. There
would be no reason why the patentee in such a situation could not
assign one invention to one person and the other invention to another.
Thus a sole patentee has an unfettered discretion to deal with
his rights as granted by the letters patent. There are, however, sug-
gestions that a co-owner of a patent does not have such wide rights
of dealing with his interest in the patent. Does he, in fact, not have
the same rights? And, if not, why not? That is, what is the basis
for the restrictions, if any, that are imposed? Why then should not a
co-owner have the same rights? That is, what is the basis for these
restrictions that are imposed?
The first point to consider, then, is whether these restrictions
may be inferred and justified by the case law.
In Noxon v. Noxon 6 a licence agreement was entered into
between the patentee of an invention and the defendants. Subse-
quently, the patentee assigned the patent to the plaintiff. By assign-
ment, the plaintiff assigned an undivided one fourth part of all his
rights, title and interest in the patent to X. By assignment, X then
assigned to the defendants his 6ne fourth interest. It was held
"competent for them (the defendants) to put an end to the license
and proceed to make the thing invented as part-owner of the letters
patent"
In Re Hars7ey & Knighton's Patent,8 a patent was granted to
Harsley and Knighton. Knighton assigned all his interest in the
patent to Oakes and he further purported to release and discharge
Oakes from all "incumbrances, suits, causes of action, or suit claims,
or demands whatever which they, the said George Knighton and
Thomas Harsley, or either of them.. . had, or but for the indenture
might have or have had, against Thomas Haden Oakes". 9 Lord
Romilly, M.R. held that the purported agreement entered into by
Knighton and Oakes was invalid and said that because the patent
was granted to two persons "either of them might use it, but neither
can dispose of the right of the other".' °
5 See footnote 1, s. 28 M).
6 (1894), 24 O.R. 401.
7 Ibid., at p. 406.
8 (1869), L.R. 8 Eq. 475.
9 Ibid., at p. 475.
30 Ibid., at p. 477.
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In Powell v. Head,n' the plaintiffs were the co-owners of the
copyright and right of representation and performance of a dramatic
entertainment. The other co-owner was Mrs. L. who had granted a
licence to the defendant without the authority of her co-owner. In
his judgment, Jessel M.R. stated that:
"there is no possibility of arguing, in respect of these statutory provisions,
that one of the two part-owners of the right or liberty of representing or
causing to be represented could license a third person to represent without
the consent of the other part owner or owners".12
The effect of these decisions has been commented upon by the
two leading text writers on patents. Biggar' 3 uses Noxon v. Noxon
to support his contention that each co-owner may assign his interest
or any part of it. Fox, on the other hand, in his treatise14 adopts a
contrary view. He is of the opinion that co-owners are subject to
restriction in the assignability and licencing of their interests.
It is submitted that Noxon v. Noxon does not sustain the position
taken by Biggar, namely that a co-owner may assign a portion of his
interest. In the Noxon case, X assigned his entire interest and thus
the question was not raised as to whether a partial share could be
assigned.
The latter two cases were cited by Fox in support of his conten-
tion that one co-owner cannot grant licences without the consent of
his co-owners. In the Harsley case, Knighton assigned the whole of
his interest in the patent to Oakes and did not enter into a licencing
agreement. In his judgment, Lord Romilly considered that one co-
owner could not licence without accounting to the other. However,
it is submitted that his remarks are obiter, as it was not a licencing
transaction (on the facts). It is submitted that the Pow-;l case may
be distinguished on the grounds that the essential nature of a copy-
right and a patent are dissimilar, and also that this decision was
decided on the particular wording of a statute.
Thus, although the cases do not support completely the view
taken by Biggar, neither do they substantiate in toto the position
taken by Fox.
It is submitted, therefore, that the cases do not offer any sup-
port for the proposition that a co-owner is limited with respect to the
assignability or licencing of his interest. But by examining the
fundamental nature of a patent, it is submitted that these restrictions
should exist. In Mathers v. Green,'5 Lord Cranworth L.C. in consid-
ering the nature of a patent right stated that:
"the right conferred is a right to exclude alH the world other than the
grantees from using the invention".16
11 (1879), 12 Ch. D. 686.
12TIbid., at p. 690.
30. M. Biggar, Canadian Patent Law and Practice, (Toronto, Burroughs
& Company (Eastern) Limited, 1927), p. 65.
14H. G. Fox, Canadian Patent Law and Practice, 3rd ed. (The Carswell
Company, Limited), v. 1, pp. 607-610.
x535L.J. Ch. 1; 13 L.T. 420; 55 E.R. 599.
16 Ibid., at p. 3.
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It follows that the original co-patentees have defined rights when
the patent is granted. If the whole interest is assigned by one of them
to one person only, then the share of the monopoly enjoyed by the
original co-owner will be unaffected but if a part only of the subject
matter is assigned, it follows that their rights as originally conferred
will be diminished. Therefore, there is justification for allowing one
co-owner to assign away his interest in the patent, but not a partial
share. This equally applies to assigning the whole subject matter to
more than one person.17 Take for example the case where one co-
owner assigns his interest to two persons. No matter in what pro-
portions each of them take, the original co-patentee's share in the
monopoly will be reduced to one-third. The same argument is applic-
able to licencing.j8 If one of the two co-owners were to grant a
licence, the patent rights would be distributed among three persons.19
CONCLUSION
The Patent Act does not, in any of its terms, either expressly or
by implication preclude one co-owner from assigning either a part
of his share or his whole interest to more than one person or licencing
at his pleasure. In addition, there are no cases which directly reject
the possibility that this may be done.
However, the fundamental concept of a patent requires, in order
that the patent should have its intended effect, that these above-
mentioned restrictions should be imposed.
ROBERT ORD*
RACE AND NATIONALITY RESTRICTIONS IN THE IMMIGRA-
TION ACT: IS A REVISION OVERDUE? Canada's position in a
Commonwealth of Nations embracing Anglo-Saxon as well as Afro-
Asian nations is one of challenge. We have the singular opportunity
to demonstrate that we can adjust to an international society of
multi-racial equals within the Commonwealth and without. In this
time of peril, we must re-assess our immigration policy. It must be
consistent with the ideals to which we profess to adhere, since we
offer these ideals to the emerging nations as alternatives to the
Communist route to national maturity.
17 Dr. Fox suggests that the inherent nature of a patent right would
prohibit one co-owner from dealing with his interest so as to diminish the
share in the monopoly enjoyed by the co-owner.
18 A license prevents that from being unlawful which, but for the license,
would be unlawful.
19 It is suggested, that one co-owner may grant an exclusive licence,
reserving in himself no interest in the patent. In such case, the share of the
monopoly enjoyed by the other co-owner would not be reduced since the
licensee would in effect, be stepping into the shoes of his licensor (co-owner)
for the duration of the period.
*Mr. Ord ds in the Second Year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
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